Research
Secure and Trustworthy Intelligent Systems
My research develops security and assurance methods for intelligent systems spanning foundation models, sensing, robotics, and computing hardware. I study how adversarial effects enter and propagate across data, models, sensing, reasoning, system execution, and physical interaction, and use these insights to develop detection, defense, and evaluation mechanisms for trustworthy AI-enabled systems. My long-term goal is to establish end-to-end trust in intelligent systems—from models to machines.
Trustworthy Foundation Models and AI Agents

Securing foundation-model ecosystems against compromised third-party components.
Foundation models are increasingly deployed through prompts, fine-tuning, parameter-efficient adapters, retrieval, external tools, and autonomous agents. These mechanisms introduce new attack surfaces, including jailbreaks, backdoors, compromised model components, and malicious internal states.
Our research develops practical security and assurance mechanisms for these emerging AI ecosystems. Recent work includes dynamic defenses against jailbreak attacks, runtime detection of backdoored LoRA adapters, and analysis of how compromised AI components can affect downstream applications. More broadly, we seek continuous assurance methods that preserve model utility while improving the security of deployed foundation models and AI agents.
Selected Work:
Secure Intelligent Sensing and Embodied AI

Security of LLM-powered embodied robotic systems.

Physical security of LiDAR-based intelligent sensing.
As AI moves from digital environments into autonomous vehicles, robots, and other cyber-physical systems, security failures can propagate from sensing and perception to reasoning, planning, control, and ultimately physical action. Our research studies security across this complete embodied-AI loop.
Our work spans physical attacks against LiDAR and 3D perception, secure intelligent sensing, and emerging threats to LLM-powered robotic systems. Recent research shows that even a robot's own internal state and action history can become a hidden attack surface, motivating end-to-end defenses that jointly protect perception, reasoning, and physical execution.
Selected Work:
- Silent Sabotage: Internal State Triggered Backdoor Attacks on LLM-Powered Robotic Systems
- Robust Roadside Physical Adversarial Attack Against Deep Learning in LiDAR Perception Modules
- 3D-Adv: Black-Box Adversarial Attacks against Deep Learning Models through 3D Sensors
- Robust Adversarial Objects against Deep Learning Models
This research is supported in part by the NSF ERI project Towards Robust and Secure Intelligent 3D Sensing Systems (Award No. 2347426).
Cross-Layer Hardware and Systems Security

Reasoning LLMs for hardware design and generation.

Hardware side-channel analysis for AI system security.
The trustworthiness of modern AI systems depends not only on models and data, but also on the software and hardware stacks on which they execute. Our research investigates security across these layers, including information leakage, side-channel analysis, hardware vulnerabilities, and interactions between AI models and their underlying computing platforms.
We also study the reverse direction: how AI and foundation models can support hardware design, debugging, and security assurance. Our recent work explores domain-specific and reasoning language models for hardware generation and revision, while our future work seeks to combine model behavior, software execution, and hardware-level signals for cross-layer AI assurance and secure hardware/software co-design.
Selected Work:
- Building Reasoning LLMs for Hardware Design Generation via Function-Aligned Differentiated Revision
- Hardware Phi-1.5B: A Large Language Model Encodes Hardware Domain Specific Knowledge
- LLM4SecHW: Leveraging Domain-Specific Large Language Model for Hardware Debugging
- DeepEM: Deep Neural Networks Model Recovery through EM Side-Channel Information Leakage
Secure AI for Scientific Discovery and Bioinformatics

Revealing genotype-dependent security risks in AI-enabled peptide discovery.
AI is increasingly becoming part of scientific discovery pipelines, where model outputs can directly influence subsequent computational experiments, candidate selection, and scientific decisions. This creates a new security challenge: compromised models or data pipelines may preserve conventional performance metrics while introducing hidden, context-dependent risks.
Through our NSF CICI project, we investigate security and assurance for AI-enabled bioinformatics workflows. Our work studies data and model integrity, backdoor vulnerabilities in generative models, domain-aware auditing, and independent validation. Recent research demonstrates how compromised generative antimicrobial-peptide models can preserve conventional measures of utility and safety while increasing predicted immunogenicity risk for specific host contexts. These results motivate application-aware security evaluation for scientific AI systems.
Selected Work:
This research is supported by the NSF CICI project Safeguarding AI in Bioinformatics: Enhancing Cybersecurity in Biological Data Infrastructure (Award No. 2419880).
